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Project Apollo and the Cold War: Understanding the Space
Race as Ritual Combat
Hal Issen

Why did we go to the moon? Even the astronomers who worked on Project Apollo could not
pretend that it was inspired by a driving love of science. It is hard to believe that the urge to explore
was the motive; less than one-percent of the surface was ever explored by man. Three out of ten
missions were canceled before the program was abandoned twenty-five years ago, with no plans
to return. What did Project Apollo mean?
President Kennedy proposed Project
Apollo at a special session of Congress on
May 25, 1961 after only four months in office.
If The Soviet Union was first in outer space,
His campaign claims of Soviet superiority in
that
is the most serious defeat the United
missiles and space
States has suffered in many, many years.
had raised alarms about declining American
John F. Kennedy
influence. While many of his claims about
1960
Presidential
Campaign
weapons were fabrications,
the public had not forgotten the panic caused
by Sputnik I, launched by the USSR on OctoI cannot, for the life of me, see any reason
ber 4, 1957. President Eisenhower was bewhy
we should be using or misusing military
mused by all the hand-wringing and cries of
talents to explore the moon.
doom, and impatient with the mad rush to
Dwight D. Eisenhower
drain the national treasury. Eisenhower knew
Presidential
Press Conference
that Sputnik was not a serious security threat
November 4, 1959
because it could not be maneuvered in orbit,
and that the US could have launched more
sophisticated satellites before the Soviets. But
the US had been concentrating its efforts on its missile system. Eisenhower was concerned with
building a strong defense without getting deeply into debt. After that was in place he was interested in a modest space program, but insisted that it be strictly scientific. Perhaps in retrospect
Eisenhower’s vision can be appreciated as being more accurate, but Kennedy’s hectoring of
Eisenhower for a ‘Missile Gap’ and Sputnik was more persuasive, and probably was a decisive
point in his election over Nixon. Why did the public believe Kennedy’s interpretation of looming
catastrophe instead of accepting Eisenhower’s reasonable assessment of the facts?
The significance of the Soviet space program was shaped by a set of values encoded in the
American national identity. Kennedy’s interpretation proposed that the Soviet advances in space
were not an actual threat to our defenses, but
rather represented a decline in American suThe existence of an area of free land, its conperiority. This appealed to the American selftinuous recession, and the advance of Ameriidentity of
can
settlement westward, explain American
being strong, resourceful, rugged, and optidevelopment.
mistic. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner
Frederick Jackson Turner
was the first to tie this identity to the settleThe Frontier in American History, 1920
ment of the American Frontier. Americans

proudly trace their heritage to pilgrims and pioneers. Turner proposed that the West was a place of
clear opportunities and demands. He explained that the uniquely American character of individualism and practicality was strengthened by the challenges and ordeals of taming the Western frontier. The rugged individualists who settled the West were responsible for developing national
resolve, and provided leadership for those who remained in the stagnant, institutionalized East.
Turner’s work has since been re-evaluated by studying the institutions that made it possible to
settle the Western Frontier. While there is no doubt that the pioneers needed perseverance and
fortitude, it is also true that they could not have survived without bureaucratic institutions such as
railroads and Army posts. The West was actually an outpost that funneled raw resources into the
developed East. Those who settled the West were no more inherently endowed with virtue than
those who stayed to build commerce in the East. But Turner’s explanation for America’s strength,
as illustrated by stories of rugged frontiersmen such as Dan’l Boone and Davey Crockett, captured the public’s affection. These stories became referential models to those who tried to understand America’s power. The impact of Turner’s thesis became greater than if all of his interpretation was factual. Turner’s Frontier thesis became a myth.
Myths are stories that contain a value system. The word ‘myth’ is often used to mean ‘untrue.’
However, the value system within a myth has a significance to the people who know the story,
even if the particular events of that myth never happened. The truth of a myth is in its power to
motivate people towards particular action.
Myths are often associated with ancient
cultures. For example, ancient Athens is remembered as much for the stories of the
The Homeric world owes its unity to its being
Olympian pantheon of gods as it is for its cona literary creation. Once it is submitted to a
tributions to Western thought, such as scienhistorical analysis, different, more or less comtific reasoning, theater, and democracy. For a
patible layers become apparent, detectable
brief period Athens was the center of a Helin the weaponry, the modes of combat, and
lenic culture that was united by a view of the
the varying social and psychological status of
world that had its origins in the Greek myths
the warrior.
told by Homer and Hesiod. Honor was the
Jean-Pierre Vernant
highest virtue in that worldview, and the norMyth and Society in Ancient Greece
mal state of being was competing for honor
against everyone else. One source for this
structure of reality is in Homer’s Iliad. This is
the story of two great nations locked in a tenyear war to regain the honor of a king whose wife had run off with a foreign prince. The Athenians
identified themselves as brave and noble people because they associated themselves with the
heroes in those myths. We might wonder if it was a war worth fighting, but the Homeric myths
explain why this was a legitimate cause in the Greek way of thinking. According to Homer the only
way to regain honor after such a dishonor was to fight for it and win it back. The Iliad illustrates
virtue in aggression, pride, loyalty, the ability to fight well, and it encouraged that type of behavior.
Many of the activities in Greek life were spent acting out the value system contained in these
myths. The many rituals honoring the gods, the countless wars between the city-states, election to
public office, marriages and funerals were enactments of Homeric honor.
As illustrated by these examples of the influence of the Homeric myths to Ancient Athens, all
myths share these common characteristics:
1. Myths offer ways of ordering existence. They give a model for the basic structure of
reality. Myths explain and give meaning to the outside events that affect a society.
2. Myths inform man about himself. People take on a self-identity based on historical events.

Myths connect a group of people as a selected order of humanity.
3. Myths express a saving power in human life. Myths provide salvation. They give hope
during hardship by illustrating the power to transform misfortune into triumph.
4. Myths provide patterns for human action. Myths encourage particular behavior. Stories
that embody ideal action illustrate the conduct that is valued and virtuous.
5. Myths are enacted in ritual. The values in myths are expressed in symbolic acts.
President Kennedy used the myth of the
American frontier to interpret the events of the
Russian Space Program. The five characterThe pioneers of old gave up their safety, their
istics of myth can be seen in Kennedy’s
comfort and sometimes their lives to build a
speech to the Democratic National Convennew world here in the West. . . . They were
tion during the 1960 Presidential campaign.
determined to make that new world strong and
He offers a model of reality as a world that is
free, to overcome its hazards and its hardfull of hazards, hardships, and perils, but also
ships.... We stand today on the edge of a new
opportunities. He connected Americans to the
frontier-the frontier of the 1960’s-a frontier of
historic pioneers who tamed the West. He ofunknown opportunities and perils-a frontier of
fered the power of salvation through deterunfulfilled hopes and threats.
mination and sacrifice. He encouraged action
John F. Kennedy
to build a new world that was strong and free,
Democratic National Convention
regardless of the cost, and held this conduct
July 15, 1960
up as being virtuous. Lastly, by using the
American frontier as a symbol for his administration, Kennedy issued a mythic call to enact these values in his programs and plans.
The Frontier myth is a call for action, and Kennedy was expected to come up with bold, new
initiatives after he had been elected. The Soviets and their communist surrogates were dealing
embarrassing set-backs to the US, especially during the Bay of Pigs crisis. Clearly some action
was required. But these activities involved confrontation and aggression against a heavily armed,
capable, and belligerent adversary. While the Frontier myth included battles, the marauding Natives were seen more as a lethal menace than a threat to society. The Frontier myth only explains
the virtues of expansion; some other myth was needed to explain the significance of war.
The Old Testament calls for the righteous to rise up in arms and rid the earth of the wicked.
There cannot be co-existence with those who have not given themselves over to the highest moral
authority because their mere presence is an abomination, and hateful to God.
The Cold War was an ideological struggle between the US and the USSR for political and
economic world dominance. Both the US and the USSR were convinced of their alignment with

the highest moral authority, and neither
could tolerate each other’s continued existence.
The Communist Manifesto preached the
moral superiority of the socialist system and
called for the over-throw of capitalism. Fueled
by the rhetoric of Marx and Lenin, the Soviets
saw themselves on a noble mission to eradicate capitalist exploitation. Even though it was
officially an atheist state, the Soviet sense of
righteousness can be seen as having roots in
the Old Testament myth of war. The Western

[In the Old Testament] God, the creator and
sole governor of the universe, was absolutely
and always on the side of a certain chosen
community, and its wars, consequently, were
Holy Wars, waged in the name and interest
of God’s will.
Joseph Campbell
Myths to Live By

nations saw communism as a creeping, subversive, insidious threat to all that was valued. A movement resembling a holy crusade to rid the planet of communism prevailed in the West. Complicating matters were atomic bombs and guided missiles; making it a possibility to annihilate an enemy.
Full-scale nuclear war eventually had to be considered if the Old Testament was used to interpret
the significance of war.
Unlike the Old Testament, the Trojan War
in Homer’s Iliad had nothing to do with the
righteousness of God. The Greeks and the
Trojans recognized the same gods, who might
War was quite natural to the Greeks of the
intercede on either side depending on factors
classical
period. Organized, as they were, into
that had nothing to do with righteousness. The
small cities, all equally jealous of their own
gods were only concerned with honor, and war
independence
and equally anxious to affirm
was one way to gain honor. The accomplishtheir
supremacy,
they saw warfare as the
ments of the Russian space program were
normal expression of the rivalry that governed
interpreted by Kennedy as representing a
relations
between states.
decline in American superiority. Because this
Jean-Pierre Vernant
concept of national honor was so important
Myth
and
Society
in Ancient Greece
for his decision, looking at the structure of war
in the Iliad might provide a better understanding of why the public endorsed Kennedy’s proposal, and how Project Apollo owed its construction to the ancient Greek myths.
The Greeks of the classic period lived in city-states that were proud of their independence and
self-determination. While the Greek city-states defended themselves against foreign invaders,
such as the Persians in 479 BC, they also constantly fought wars against each other. The object of
Greek city-state warfare was different from that of defending against foreign invaders. These wars
were intended to demonstrate superior technical skills on a battlefield. Obviously this involved
killing, but the primary goal was not to wipe out the opposing army. It was to make it turn tail and
abandon the field. The battlefield might not have any particular strategic value, and may even be
abandoned after a victory monument had been erected. The competing armies would only fight for
a fixed period, although later battles involving
the same antagonists would inevitably follow.
In summary, the idealized structure of Greek
city-state war was to show up at a designated
The war has a time limit set upon it, for a camplace within a fixed time and secure victory
paign normally takes place during the sumby demonstrating a superior mastery of the
mer and ends before the onset of winter. The
technical skills of warfare. The significance
decisive battle is fought on chosen ground, a
of war, in this context, was to gain honor.
pedion, where it is possible to deploy the two
President Kennedy’s proposal to Conphalanxes of heavy infantry. Each of the citgress for Project Apollo has the same strucies waging war seeks not so much to annihiture as the idealized Greek city-state war. He
late
its adversary, or even to destroy its army,
established a time limit of “before the decade
but rather to force it to acknowledge its supeis out.” He had chosen the battlefield and set
rior strength as the outcome of a test as rulea criterion for victory, that of “landing a man
bound as a tournament.
on the moon and returning him safely to earth.”
Jean-Pierre Vernant
By claiming that “no single project in this peMyth and Society in Ancient Greece
riod will be more impressive to mankind,” he
explained the significance of the proposal as
gaining honor in the international community.

Kennedy’s proposal was a challenge to Congress and the American people to share his
I believe that this nation should commit itself
vision and fund Project Apollo, but it was also
to
achieving the goal, before the decade is
a declaration of war against the Soviets. It was
out, of landing a man on the moon and renot a call for all-out annihilation as in the Old
turning
him safely to earth. No single project
Testament model of war, but a challenge to
in
this
period
will be more impressive to mangain honor by demonstrating technical excelkind.
lence. The Soviets understood the declaraJohn F. Kennedy
tion for what it was and accepted it, as proven
Special
Address
to Congress
by the recent disclosures of their own lunar
May 25, 1961
landing program that was designed to beat
the US. The international community also recognized the significance of Project Apollo, as
shown by the overwhelming praise and congratulations given to the Apollo crews after
their successful missions.
Kennedy gave a structure for Project Apollo that equated technological excellence with cultural superiority; this is a mythic structure in accord with the first characteristic of myths. Unlike
Eisenhower, Kennedy interpreted Soviet advances in space as a challenge to the American selfimage of optimistic and determination. This self-identity, connected to the American pioneers,
fulfills the second characteristic of myths. He claimed that the impressive accomplishment of Project
Apollo had the power to regain international honor and save America. Apollo’s power to save
agrees with the third characteristic of myths.
If the Space Race was a mythic structure of war, than the astronauts and cosmonauts were the
warriors who gained honor for their people. The ancient Greeks believed that the strength and
abilities of their warriors represented the collective virtue of their societies, and that victory in battle
by their army was an indication of the superiority of their city- state. The astronauts were
given hero status. While there were certainly
benefits to being a hero, the scrutiny that was
put on their personal conduct was sometimes
puzzling, annoying, and even chafing to them.
Armies, through the energy, discipline, and
They were men who had been selected based
stanches of their respective fighting men, are
on their skills as pilots, and not necessarily
the measure of the power and cohesion, the
for their virtuous personal conduct.
dunamis, of the two civic communities conA myth encourages certain behavior per
fronting each other.
the third common characteristic. In the
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Homeric structure of war, victory by the astroMyth and Society in Ancient Greece
nauts was symbolic of the supremacy of
American society. The American public’s selfimage as virtuous people could not be validated by degenerate astronauts. Because virtue is supposed to triumph in the Homeric
myths of honor, a victory by immoral astronauts would be a confusing mixed signal at best, and
perhaps even a defeat. The “all-American” image of the astronauts was an important part of the
mythic structure of Project Apollo.
The last characteristic of myth is that it is enacted in ritual, and the Greek structure of city-state
warfare incorporated this aspect of myth. Setting limits on the time and location for battle and
criteria for victory resembles an athletic competition more than combat. Some battles were even

arranged to be fought as tournaments between individual champions or small teams,
while the rest of the army watched from the
sidelines without interfering. The ancient
Greeks used this same structure in the famous
Those who take part in the Games confront
Panhellenic games, which we have adapted
each
other in the name of the same city-state
as the modern Olympic games. The astroas those that go to war against each other.
nauts were applauded because they repreJean-Pierre Vernant
sent our country as Cold War warriors in ritual
Myth
and
Society
in Ancient Greece
combat in the same way that we cheer on our
athletes. A tournament structure requires a set
of rules; the US and the USSR signed United
Nations agreements on peaceful uses of
space that served as the tournament rules
during the Space Race.
The Athenians were particularly successful in naval combat, which was another use of the
tournament structure. Ancient Greek warships were triremes; long, thin, and low-draught vessels
that were powered in combat by oarsmen in three ascending levels. Each trireme had a crew of
200, of which 170 were rowers and the rest were officers, provisioners, archers, and combat
marines. The objective of battle was to ram the enemy ship; maneuverability was very important
and the steering oarsman’s skill was critical. But collective discipline was also important because
each rower’s strokes had to be coordinated with those ahead and behind, as well as any above or
below. The crews trained constantly to master these skills. Athens has a fleet of over 400 ship at
its peak and had to hire professional rowers to fill the 68,000 slots. On top of the rower’s pay, the
large fleet was expensive to build and maintain. Taxes from the state treasury paid for the large
fleet, and commerce was developed as a result of all the spending. The port-town of
Piraeus thrived as a ship-building and shipping center.
What is most important in naval warfare is
Project Apollo was also a large-scale pubmaneuverability of the craft and all that this
licly funded project that stimulated commerce,
entails in the way of training, experience, and
provided jobs, and contributed to national
inventiveness, and adequate state funds.
pride. The project was supported by large
Jean-Pierre Vernant
numbers of anonymous workers who were
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
sometimes mercenaries looking for employment. Local communities, such as Brevard
county, thrived as a result. The engineers
managing their systems during a launch sequence had to be as coordinated as the banks of oars sweeping the water to bring as a trireme
around to ram another warship. All this effort supported one individual responsible for guiding the
vessel, and victory or defeat depended on his skill. Just as the Greeks built a ritual structure for
their naval warfare based on the Homeric myths of honor, the superpowers also constructed the
Space Race into ritualized and symbolic actions.

Summary and Conclusion
Project Apollo was symbolic action that had a mythic structure of honor similar to Greek citystate warfare. It satisfied the needs of the American people to challenge and defeat the communists. Eisenhower’s pragmatic vision could not see the value in ritual combat, while Kennedy
successfully used the Space Race as a symbolic competition for honor. The US and the USSR
was engaged in other struggles at the same time as the Space Race. The threat of nuclear warfare
hung over the military confrontations in Korea, Cuba, Berlin, and Vietnam. Apollo’s value continues to be questioned, but its cost and results could be compared to any one of these activities. The
value of Apollo might be considered in terms of it being a safe and productive area for the US and
the USSR to act out their competition for honor.
Project Apollo’s acceptance was due to
its particular structure that addressed specific
Cold War tensions. However, the same tenFor some of those involved in the lunar
sions no longer exist, and the same construclanding
decision, space activity appeared
tion is no longer appropriate for the human
to be a ‘surrogate’ for [military] capacities,
exploration of space. But because of its sucinvolving them in space-related work rather
cess, Project Apollo has become the referenthan for military developments.
tial model for all space exploration. Images
John Logsdon
from Apollo are engraved in our culture; the
The Decision To Go To The Moon
pictures of the earth rise and Buzz Aldrin on
the surface of the moon are two great icons
of our time. There is a resurgence of interest
in Apollo, and space exploration as the ‘final
frontier’ is a recognized formulation in books,
television specials, and movies. The drama
and grandeur of the space program have reI talk to people who say, “Gosh, John, all
newed interest in seeing its accomplishments
we
gotta do is think back twenty-five years
as a bold and noble time in our nation’s hisago
and we can go to Mars the same way.”
tory. The lunar landing program is in the proI
say,
“No, you can’t. It was a unique set
cess of becoming a narrative about the deof circumstances that lined up all those
velopment of American character and fortidominoes.”
tude. Project Apollo is creating mythic proporJohn Aaron
tions of its own.
Apollo Flight Controller

The opinions expressed are my own. They do not represent those of either the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the United Space Alliance.
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